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Abstract
Observers of economic policy-making in developing countries often suggest that consensus
and cohesion within technocratic policy elites facilitate the implementation and consolidation
of reforms, but have not clearly defined these terms or the relationship between them. Like-
wise, political sociologists argue that social networks account for elite cohesion, but have not
adequately specified the relevant structural properties of these networks. This paper argues
that structural network cohesion facilitates elite consensus formation by enabling cooperation,
while fragmented networks promote competition between factions and hence conflict. I support
this hypothesis empirically by examining two cases in which elite consensus was severely chal-
lenged by financial crises: Mexico and Argentina. Mexican policy elites sustained consensus
throughout the crisis, whereas conflict plagued the Argentine elite. Likewise, while the Mexican
technocratic elite is highly cohesive, the Argentine elite is fragmented and factionalized. I docu-
ment this hypothesis using a mixed-methods approach that embeds an analysis of elite networks
within a comparative analysis of policy-making patterns drawing on extensive fieldwork in both
countries.
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Technocratic elites are key actors in the transformation of economic policy, particularly in the
developing world. Many researchers argue that professional economists and other policy experts
occupying senior positions in state agencies such as central banks and finance ministries have facili-
tated the emergence of pro-market policy consensus (Babb, 2001; Centeno, 1997; Chwieroth, 2010;
Dezalay and Garth, 2002; Fourcade, 2006). Scholars also argue that the ability of these technocratic
elites to maintain internal consensus is a crucial variable in the policy-making process, because in-
ternal unity helps reform advocates maneuver in difficult political environments (Chwieroth, 2007;
Dargent, 2014; Haggard and Kaufman, 1995; Williamson and Haggard, 1994; Teichman, 2001).
However, the literature does not define elite consensus and cohesion systematically, risking confla-
tion of ideational and structural concepts; likewise, while political sociologists argue that networks
account for elite cohesion, they do not adequately specify the relevant structural features of these
networks. This paper clarifies this relationship, differentiating between consensus as a state of
expressed policy opinions and structural network cohesion, and showing that variation in elite
cohesion can account for policy consensus.
In order to do so, I examine consensus formation among technocratic policy elites in two coun-
tries, Mexico and Argentina, during major financial crises (in 1994 and 2001, respectively). Fi-
nancial crises impose major strains on elites and pose a series of macroeconomic policy challenges
including fiscal policy, debt management, monetary and exchange rate policy, financial regulation
and bank “bail-outs.” In this context, elite consensus is not a foregone conclusion, and the ab-
sence of policy debate invites explanation. In the Mexican case, technocrats sustained consensus
despite adopting policies that garnered significant external criticism. In contrast, Argentine elites
were divided by intense conflict despite shared professional backgrounds and partisan affiliations.
In comparative perspective, these two cases pose a puzzling contrast between elite consensus and
conflict. Conventional theories based on political institutions, elite professionalization, and sectoral
business interests cannot account for these divergent policy-making processes. This paper thus
underscores the importance of a relational perspective on policy-making, and in particular the role
of elite networks in shaping policy-making dynamics.
I argue that the structure of elite networks plays an important role in moderating elite conflict,
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facilitating cooperation and consensus formation when networks are cohesive while promoting dis-
sent when elites are fragmented and factionalized. In Mexico, a cohesive elite formed in the 1980s,
effectively putting policy control in the hands of a close-knit group of technocratic officials; this co-
hesive structure facilitated consensus formation despite major policy failures and external criticism.
In contrast, the Argentine policy elite is fragmented: structurally disconnected individuals and fac-
tions compete for policy influence, promoting conflict. This paper documents the link between
elite cohesion and consensus formation using a mixed-methods approach that embeds an analysis
of elite networks within a comparative examination of policy-making dynamics relying on extensive
interview-based fieldwork. The broad analysis follows a cross-national comparative design, while
the network analysis deploys a larger-N approach within each country. Cohesive blocking analysis
(Moody and White, 2003) of elite networks documents the greater cohesiveness of the Mexican
bureaucratic elite, while qualitative data provide evidence of the varying level of consensus and the
mechanisms linking this outcome to elite network structure.
The following section reviews previous discussions of elite consensus and cohesion in the lit-
erature on economic policy making, clarifying these concepts and the relationship between them.
Next, I briefly introduce the qualitative data, document the varying level of elite consensus, and de-
scribe mechanisms of consensus formation. The following section details the network methodology
and shows that the Mexican bureaucratic elite was substantially more cohesive than its Argentine
counterpart. Then, I address alternative explanations for elite consensus. The conclusion returns
to the implications of elite cohesion for policy implementation and consolidation, as well as broader
theoretical implications.
1 Technocratic elite cohesion and policy-making
Many scholars have observed that in developing countries, technocratic elite cohesion and consensus
are crucial variables in the policy-making process. When policymakers adopt often unpopular liber-
alization and austerity measures, internal unity facilitates policy implementation and consolidation.
For example, Centeno (1997: 36) notes that “no reform program can proceed if there are divisions
regarding appropriate policies within the ruling circles. . . The alternative to such a cohesion may
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be elite gridlock.” Likewise, many political scientists have argued that a “coherent” or “cohesive”
technocratic “reform team” is critical to the success of liberalization projects (Chwieroth, 2007;
Haggard and Kaufman, 1995; Teichman, 2001; Williamson and Haggard, 1994). Similarly, Dar-
gent (2014: 55–57) argues that consensus among technocratic experts increases their leverage by
de-legitimizing policies not supported by these elites.
However, elite “cohesion” and “consensus” are rarely defined explicitly and often confounded.
Cohesion most often implicitly refers to homogeneous policy preferences among elites; however,
some authors also imply a structural component. For example, Williamson and Haggard (1994)
equate cohesion with both the unity and the “organization” of the reform team, without defining
“organization.” Similarly, Teichman (2001: 90) moves freely between the terms “consensus” and
“cohesion,” a concept with structural implications. These discussions thus risk conflating two
distinct concepts: the homogeneity or unity of elite policy preferences, and the organizational or
structural properties of the policy elite. In order to avoid this conflation, I distinguish between
consensus, defined as the homogeneity of expressed policy preferences, and cohesion as a structural
property of policy elites (defined shortly). Observationally, consensus is the absence of visible
dissent among elites. This is a deliberately limited conception of consensus, because the absence
of dissent does not necessarily imply positive acceptance of a policy program. However, suppressed
beliefs are unobservable to other elites, making them like the proverbial tree falling in an empty
forest. Hence, this definition refers to observable behaviors, rather than latent attitudes.
The fact that cohesion and consensus seem so closely linked to many researchers suggests that
there may be an underlying regularity linking structural cohesion to consensus. Discussions of
elite networks in the political sociology literature suggest, but do not systematically theorize or
investigate this relationship. For example, Centeno (1997: 146) argues that in Mexico, the character
of elite political networks “helps explain the surprising cohesiveness of the elite.” More broadly,
Evans (1995: 49) argues that in developmental states “internal [interpersonal] networks are crucial
to the bureaucracy’s coherence,” above and beyond the “Weberian” features at the core of his
account. These accounts imply that networks somehow account for “cohesion” and “coherence,”
but do not adequately specify the features of networks that produce cohesion. Insofar as cohesion
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is a property of social networks, it risks circularity to argue that networks “account for” cohesion.
Thus, I reformulate this suggestion more precisely as the hypothesis that the structural cohesion
of policy elites facilitates the formation of policy consensus.
This hypothesis is consistent with a long line social network theory which links cohesion to
consensus and group solidarity more broadly (Friedkin, 1998, 2004; Knoke, 1990; Mizruchi, 1992;
White and Harary, 2001). Broadly, network theorists define cohesion as a structural pattern of ties
(relationships) among nodes (individuals) in which dense, reciprocated, or multivocal ties define
closely interconnected social groups. This broad definition can be operationalized in multiple,
mutually complementary ways, many of which rely on the concept of shortest paths, or the most
efficient set of steps between any two nodes in a social network. From this standpoint, cohesion
is defined as the degree to which a network is held together by multiple independent paths. More
formally, a group of actors is cohesive to the extent that its survival is not contingent on any
particular relationship; severing one relationship does not break apart the group as whole (Moody
and White, 2003; White and Harary, 2001).
Discussions of elite cohesion in the political sociology literature cited above are at best partially
compatible with this approach. Some authors equate cohesion with connectivity – the prevalence of
ties – itself. For example, Evans (1995: 49) implies that connections based on informal school ties
are sufficient for “coherence.” Other authors have gone further in the structural direction; Centeno
(1997: 146) describes Mexican elite networks as pyramidal patronage structures. However, mere
connectivity is the weakest conception of cohesion; moreover, from the standpoint of network theory,
hierarchical patronage systems (see Martin, 2009: ch. 6) are by definition not structurally cohesive.
This is because hierarchical structures are highly vulnerable to the removal of central nodes: if the
‘patron’ at the apex of the pyramid is removed, the network falls apart. For example, if a senior
political figure retires, the network ceases to meet even the most minimal definition of cohesion.
Thus, it is important to specify more carefully the properties of elite networks that make
them cohesive. Following social network theory, a cohesive policy elite is one in which dense
interconnections make senior policymakers members of a meaningful social group, independent
of the formal bureaucratic structure of the state. These connections are informal ties of trust
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which shape elite behavior in the policy-making process. These informal ties may originate in
common education, accumulated experience, or joint affiliations with external organizations (such
as think tanks). Conversely, when the elite is divided into multiple groups, the elite is fragmented
or factionalized. Two key dimensions of cohesion are inter-organizational cohesion, or the extent
to which technocrats in different state organizations are members of the same cohesive group,
and inter-cohort cohesion, or the extent to which successive waves of senior officials are densely
interconnected. When either organizations or cohorts are not densely linked, the elite structure is
fragmented.
Because this paper relies on a cross-national comparative methodology, specifying and docu-
menting clear mechanisms linking network structure to consensus formation provides an important
source of evidence (Mahoney, 2004). To the extent that technocratic policymakers form a cohesive
group, two main mechanisms enable elites to cooperate and form consensus: deference and dia-
logue. Deference refers to the willingness of individuals to “subordinate their desires to collective
expectations in anticipation of. . . the long run market advantages [that accrue] by virtue of group
membership” (Portes and Sensenbrenner, 1993: 1325). These long run advantages include both
material payoffs (particularly opportunities for career advancement) and more symbolic benefits,
such as the identity associated with group membership itself (Podolny and Baron, 1997). Dialogue
refers to sustained, multi-directional communication resulting in collective (rather than individu-
alistic) formation of preferences. Both deference and dialogue facilitate cooperation, rather than
competition, in the policy-making process, helping elites form consensus.
Conversely, when elite structure is fragmented, officials are isolated or form distinct factions.
These individuals and groups compete, rather than cooperate, in the policy-making process. Freed
of the strictures of group deference, policy-making behavior is entrepreneurial and opportunistic, as
elites seek to promote their policy agendas over those of competitors. Rather than develop policy
preferences collectively, individual elites or factions formulate their policy preferences independently
and seek to impose these preferences, even in the face of criticism. Such entrepreneurial behavior
foments conflict when multiple individuals or factions simultaneously attempt to shape the direction
of policy. To the extent that distinct factions or individuals are locked in a zero-sum competition
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for policy influence, they are more likely to engage in opportunistic behavior, such as attacking
competitors’ policy positions in order to gain attention and advance their own agenda. Due to the
absence of channels for dialogue, communication failures are common, exacerbating conflicts.
While these mechanisms of consensus formation are difficult to observe in the opaque world of
high-level policymaking, in the next section I present evidence of deference and dialogue in Mexico
and elite competition, policy entrepreneurship, and communication failure in Argentina. Combined
with evidence of differing network structures, these mechanisms provide substantial support for the
hypothesis that network cohesion facilitates elite consensus formation. Nevertheless, it is also
important to consider alternative explanations for the outcomes described below. I consider three
such alternatives empirically below.
First, elite network structure may not be an independent determinant of policy consensus, but
rather a reflection of underlying political institutions, such as the political regime and party system.
Partisan political actors have incentives to appoint loyalists rather than independent technocrats
(Geddes, 1994). Different levels of elite conflict may therefore be a result of variation in the level of
political competition between parties. Before 2000, the Mexican state was dominated by a stable,
semi-authoritarian regime directed by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). In contrast,
despite a long history of military rule, in 1983 the Argentine polity transitioned to a competitive (if
chaotic) democratic system characterized by regular alternation between political parties. These
institutional features undoubtedly play a role in explaining the structure of elite networks. However,
there is no simple correspondence between political institutions and elite cohesion or consensus;
in particular, elite cohesion and consensus varied over time in Mexico while political institutions
remained roughly constant. Thus, broader political institutions shape, but do not determine, elite
network structure and consensus.
A second alternative explanation rests on the role of economic ideas (Blyth, 2002) and the
professional training of policy elites (Chwieroth, 2007). Many analysts argue that the increasing
influence of technocratic policymakers with economics credentials, particularly from elite North
American economics departments, has contributed to the formation of a pro-market policy consen-
sus in developing countries (Babb, 2001; Chwieroth, 2007; Dezalay and Garth, 2002). Chwieroth
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(2007) measures “coherence” as the number of US-trained economists among senior macro-economic
policymakers. Thus, the greater level of elite consensus in Mexico may be explained by more ex-
tensive professionalization of the policy elite, and in particular the dominance of of US-educated
economists. However, I find that common training may facilitate consensus but is not sufficient: in
Argentina, conflict occurred both among policymakers with elite economics backgrounds and those
without them. Thus, while ideas are certainly relevant to policy preferences, professional training
does not provide a systematic explanation of elite consensus.
A final alternative explanation concerns the role of organized economic interests outside the
state. Both crises involved policy issues with differential effects across economic sectors, giving
organized business a substantial stake in policy decisions.1 If technocrats are the agents of business
principals, differing degrees of permeability or capture of state organizations to these external
demands might explain varying levels of elite conflict. However, as I show below, the preferences
of technocratic elites cannot always be reduced to those of particular sectors of business.
2 Crisis, macroeconomic policy and elite consensus
In order to document the level of elite conflict and the mechanisms of consensus formation, I draw
on qualitative data, including author’s interviews, recorded oral history interviews,2 published and
unpublished documents, and press reports. I interviewed 100 individuals (49 in Argentina, 44 in
Mexico and 7 in Washington, D.C.), primarily between 2008 and 2010. Interviewees included 11
former finance ministers and central bank presidents; 63% of in country interviews were with former
senior policymakers and 68% with elites who had occupied any policy position. The remaining
interviews were with academics, private sector observers and international policymakers with insight
into the policy-making process in these countries. Interviews were open-ended and varied in content
depending on the knowledge of the interviewee. These sources permitted reconstruction of the
decision-making process around particular policies. For each policy decision, I determined to the
extent possible the central actors involved, the origin of policy initiatives, and the positions taken
by influential officials. In the course of producing these accounts, it became clear that there
were frequently sharp differences of opinion, competing policy proposals, mutual attacks and open
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struggles over policy in Argentina, while these dynamics did not occur Mexico. In what follows,
I first discuss the macroeconomic dynamics of the crises in order to establish their similarity, and
then discuss the variation in elite conflict and mechanisms of consensus formation.
2.1 Macroeconomic dynamics: similarities and differences
Like many “emerging market” countries during the 1990s and early 2000s, Mexico and Argentina
experienced major financial crises sharing a number of common features (Calvo, 2007; Kaminsky
and Reinhart, 1999; Eichengreen, 2004). Following the “lost decade” of the 1980s, both countries
achieved monetary stability and experienced economic booms in the early 1990s. In both cases,
monetary policies known as “exchange rate-based stabilization” attracted financial inflows, fueling
growth but also resulting in currency over-valuation, balance of payments deficits, and growing
debt (Woodruff, 2005). In the Argentine case, fiscal deficits exacerbated debt accumulation. When
capital flows reversed due to a variety of economic and political shocks, both countries were faced
with economic collapse and large stocks of dollar-denominated debt. Both were forced to devalue
their currencies, threatening to drive both the financial system and the state itself into bankruptcy.
While Mexico narrowly avoided default, Argentina ceased payments on its foreign debts in what
was at the time the largest sovereign default on record (Blustein, 2005).
Despite these similarities, it could be that differences between these crises might themselves
account for the greater level of elite conflict in Argentina. The Argentine crisis was longer, deeper
and involved a more dramatic political collapse, sparked by a presidential resignation in 2001,
suggesting that consensus may have been simply easier to reach in Mexico. Nevertheless, while
the Argentine crisis was indeed more dramatic, the severity of the Mexican crisis should not be
understated. In some respects, the Mexican crisis was actually stronger; for example, IMF estimates
put the fiscal cost of the Mexican bank bailout at 19% of GDP, nearly twice that of Argentina
(Valencia and Laeven, 2012). An important assumption of this paper is that elite consensus in
Mexico cannot be explained by the absence of controversial policy decisions. This assumption is
justified by substantial external criticism of Mexican policies and the political consequences of the
crisis.
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Mexican policymakers made several policy errors and controversial decisions that drew inter-
national criticism, but did not create internal conflict. First, international economists (Dornbusch
and Werner, 1994) criticized policymakers’ inertia on the over-valued exchange rate and balance of
payments deficits. Second, many international observers (such as the Wall Street Journal) blamed
the central bank’s monetary policy for the crisis. Third, finance ministry officials switched to
dollar-denominated government bonds during the crisis, thus absorbing exchange rate risk for in-
ternational investors. This had the effect of dramatically increasing the peso value of the Mexican
debt following the devaluation, driving the state to the brink of bankruptcy. Fourth, inadequate fi-
nancial supervision and an ill-managed bank bailout received criticism from international observers,
including an independent auditor commissioned by the Mexican Congress.3 Yet while these prob-
lems attracted the attention of international observers, they did not generate competing policy
proposals and internal conflict – as a similar set of issues did in Argentina.
Moreover, while Mexico did not experience the deep political crisis that Argentina did, the
political strain imposed by the crisis was significant: dissatisfaction with the ruling PRI probably
contributed to the party’s loss of control over Congress in 1997 and subsequent historic loss of
the presidency in 2000 (Starr, 1999). The re-invigorated legislative arena resulted in broader
contestation of the technocratic elite’s handling of the financial crisis, particularly over the fiscal
cost of the bank bailout. Yet while this broader political contestation directly implicated the
technocratic elite, it occurred post hoc and reflected criticism of this elite, rather than conflict
within the elite itself. Thus, the political strain imposed by the crisis was substantial, raising the
question of how technocratic elites closely linked with the PRI were able avoid conflict despite these
strains.
Finally, some observers might attribute elite conflict in Argentina to particularities of the policy
context, such as the particularly rigid version of exchange rate-based stabilization (the so-called
“convertibility” system, which fixed the national currency to the dollar by law). However, elite
conflict was greater across a wide range of policy issues, including the rescue of the financial sector,
the design of a post-crisis monetary policy, and management of sovereign debt. For example,
conflicts between the Argentine central bank and finance ministry over the bank bailout were
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more intense than in Mexico, despite the fact that the bailout in Mexico proved more costly.
These conflicts began before and persisted well after the peak of the crisis and the collapse of
the government; contention between the central bank and finance ministry remained intense even
when the leaders of these organizations had been appointed by the same president, and when the
economy was beginning to emerge from the crisis. Thus, while the longer and deeper Argentine
crisis may have created more raw material for elite conflict, the character of the crisis itself does
not explain the policy-making dynamics.
2.2 Mechanisms of elite conflict and consensus formation
This section shows that despite facing similar policy issues, the Mexican bureaucratic elite was able
to sustain consensus, while policymaking in Argentina was plagued by internal conflict. One simple
indicator of the level of elite conflict in the two countries is the frequency with which senior officials
resign or are removed from office: Argentine policy disputes often culminate in the resignation or
removal of the losing side in a conflict. The resignation or removal of a senior official can often
been traced to a concrete, observable conflict. Table 1 summarizes the incidence of conflict-induced
resignations and removals in Mexico and Argentina in the years surrounding the crises.4 The table
shows that several Argentine finance ministers and central bank governors ended their terms in
resignation or removal by the executive, often because of a policy dispute. In contrast, during
the same time period in Mexico only one official was removed (in this case, because of perceived
incompetence rather than to policy conflict). In short, policy conflict leading to turnover is common
in Argentina, but relatively rare in Mexico.
[Table 1 about here]
In order to illustrate the variation in elite conflict and the mechanisms linking elite network
structure and consensus formation, I turn first to elite conflict in Argentina. During the first years
of the crisis (1999–2001), three main groups competed for policy influence; I refer to these as the
CEMA group, the “heterodox” network, and the Cavallo faction (the existence of these groups
is verified below using network data). The CEMA group consisted of conservative, University of
Chicago-trained economists affiliated with the Center for Macroeconomic Studies (CEMA) think
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tank. At the end of the 1990s, this group dominated the incumbent policy elite; both the finance
minister and the governor of the central bank belonged to this faction. As elections neared, the
heterodox network (led by a former governor of the central bank) gained influence within a center-
left coalition contesting the presidency. This faction began to aggressively criticize the incumbent
finance minister, in occasionally ad hominem attacks.5 These attacks went against ideological type,
underscoring the opportunistic quality of elite conflict in Argentina: ironically, the “heterodox”
group criticized the University of Chicago-trained finance minister for failure to balance the budget.
Because this group was isolated from incumbent policy-makers, vocal criticism and dissent was the
only means to compete for policy influence; this strategy paid off when the group’s leader was
appointed finance minister following the elections. Conflicts continued after policy control shifted
between groups; the CEMA group now assertively denounced the tax policies of the heterodox
faction.6
A second theme of conflict was a proposal for dollarization (adoption of the dollar in place
of the national currency) introduced by the CEMA-aligned governor of the central bank.7 The
dollarization proposal exemplifies the entrepreneurial policy-making process in Argentina: the plan
was designed by the central bank governor and his allies without consultation with the broader elite;
the proposal only became public when the outgoing President announced his support. Criticism
of this proposal came not only from the heterodox faction, but also from Domingo Cavallo, a
powerful former finance minister (widely recognized as the policy entrepreneur responsible for the
“convertibility” system), who called the proposal a “colossal error.”8 This conflict emerged despite
similar ideological dispositions and partisan affiliations: as finance minister, Cavallo’s faction and
the CEMA group both worked on market reforms under the Peronist Menem administration. Yet
despite the appearance of unity, the crisis exposed a deep structural rift between these factions.
Cavallo, temporarily isolated from power following his earlier resignation from the finance ministry,
competed for policy influence by loudly denouncing the CEMA group.
Conflicts between these factions escalated as the crisis neared its nadir during 2001. After
Cavallo’s vocal criticism paid off with his re-appointment as finance minister, he proposed a rela-
tively incremental modification of the currency system, which the CEMA economists aggressively
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denounced. In response, Cavallo branded the CEMA group as a whole “traitors to the fatherland,”
whereupon one member responded by comparing Cavallo to Joseph Goebbels.9 Like the dollariza-
tion proposal, this plan exemplifies entrepreneurial policy-making in Argentina; Cavallo developed
the policy without broader consultation and announced the proposal as a fait accompli. Relations
between the finance ministry and central bank deteriorated, reflecting the lack of dialogue within
the Argentine elite; communication was reduced to formal channels such as letters to the President,
rather than face-to-face dialogue.10 Cavallo introduced reforms to the central bank without inform-
ing the governor, intensifying the conflict between them and culminating in the central banker’s
ouster.11
Competition and conflict continued with new faces after the peak of the crisis. The political
crisis of December 2001 resulted in the wholesale replacement of senior officials; yet structural frag-
mentation remained and conflict between the central bank and finance ministry continued. These
conflicts centered on the financial sector rescue, debt negotiations, and the design of a monetary
regime to replace the convertibility system. Despite the change in personalities, communication
failure continued to be a problem; the finance minister and central bank governor “[didn’t] speak to
each other” and resorted to communicating through intermediaries.12 Officials competed to deter-
mine the direction of policy, resorting to opportunistic strategies; for example, the finance minister
excluded the central banker from key meetings with the IMF,13 and the head of the central bank
allegedly resorted to strategically leaking a confidential document in an attempt to gain leverage.14
These opportunistic maneuvers and communication failures underscore the competitive logic of
policymaking in Argentina and the absence of policy dialogue.
In contrast, Mexican officials managed to avoid internal conflicts by exercising deference and
capacity for dialogue in the policy-making process, despite their sometimes divergent ex ante prefer-
ences. For example, there is substantial evidence that deference and communication helped defuse
potential conflicts over currency policy prior to the devaluation of 1994. Ex ante, Mexican officials
held diverse policy preferences: for example, at least one key Treasury official argued internally for
devaluation15, and many central bank officials favored currency flexibility.16 Outside of Mexico,
the issue generated conflict; the finance minister’s own former Ph.D. adviser criticized the policy,
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drawing the minister’s denunciation of his former mentor as “a dangerous man.” Within Mexico,
however, there were no visible signs of conflict; elites did not break ranks, publicly advocate for
alternative policies, or resign their positions – as Argentine elites frequently did. Rather, officials
exercised deference, publicly supporting a policy about which they had privately expressed reserva-
tions. Ongoing policy dialogue among senior officials enabled the elite to jointly formulate policy,
rather than engage in policy entrepreneurship. For example, prior to the transfer of presidential
authority in 1994, outgoing and incoming economic officials met to discuss the option of currency
devaluation.17 At the outset of the meeting, some officials supported devaluation; however, the out-
going finance minister was able to persuade others that devaluation was unnecessary, “achieving
consensus among all of the participants.”18
Manifest consensus was not confined to the exchange rate problem (a particularly sensitive issue
due to the possibility of self-fulfilling dynamics). There was no apparent conflict over supervision of
the banking sector during the years leading up to the crisis and the management of the bailout in
the wake of the devaluation. According to international observers, lax financial supervision in the
years prior to 1994 was one of the major causes of the crisis. This policy area required close coop-
eration between the central bank and finance ministry, yet there is no evidence of competing policy
proposals. Similarly, the ill-managed and costly bank bailout deeply implicated both organizations,
yet cooperation between them appeared seamless. In the context of democratic opening after 1997,
the decisions of the technocratic elite became intensely politicized; one powerful congressman (a
future president of Mexico) demanded the dismissal of the central bank governor. But members
of the technocratic elite did not step forward to criticize existing policies or offer alternatives. In
contrast, the Argentine central bank and finance ministry feuded bitterly over a similar policy issue.
Similarly, the Mexican technocratic elite was able to reach a consensus on a new monetary regime
following the 1994 devaluation despite the fact that finance ministry and central bank officials held
divergent ex ante preferences.19 Central bank officials were able to persuade the finance ministry
to defer to the Bank’s policy preference (for a flexible exchange rate), defusing a potential source
of conflict between the organizations. Adoption of the Bank’s favored policy was not a foregone
conclusion: the decision of Mexican policymakers occurred at a time when flexible currencies were
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widely seen as risky and untested in developing countries.20 At least one prominent central banker,
Francisco Gil, openly advocated adoption of a “hard peg” similar to Argentina’s “convertibility”
system. In contrast to Argentine elites, Gil did not attempt to impose his preferred policy over the
objections of competing elites, criticize alternatives, or resign his position when his proposal was
not accepted.21 Indeed, even after his promotion to the position of finance minister, he did not
attempt to impose this preference. Rather, he showed deference rather than break ranks with his
peers. This cooperation was enabled by the capacity of the Mexican elite for dialogue.22 As one
official put it, “there’s always communication [between the Bank of Mexico and Treasury]. . . if the
Treasury Secretary has an opinion [about monetary policy], he simply invites them to a meeting.
There’s a permanent dialogue.”23 This fluid dialogue contrasts sharply with the frequent breakdown
of communication in Argentina.
3 Elite cohesion in Mexico and Argentina
3.1 Inferring policy networks
In order to document the varying cohesion of the Mexican and Argentine technocratic elites, I
compiled career history data for senior officials in the central banks and finance ministries (the
Mexican Secretariat of the Treasury and Argentine Economy Ministry). I also include the Mexican
Secretariat of Programming and Budget (SPP) until its dissolution, because it was historically an
important force shaping macroeconomic policy. Despite comparing three Mexican organizations to
two in Argentina, I still find substantially higher cohesion in Mexico. Data sources include official
directories, archival sources and reliable internet sources (such as official biographies and CVs).
The full data begin in 1977 in Mexico and 1984 in Argentina, because inferring networks at the
time of the crises requires data on past appointments, as explained below. The main analysis infers
elite networks from positions held since 1983 (1984 in Argentina); this starting point is appropriate
because it marks the transition to democracy in Argentina and the shift towards neoliberalism in
Mexico (Babb, 2001; Centeno, 1997). Then, I extend the analysis by incorporating earlier data for
Mexico in order to document the temporal variation in elite cohesion under the one-party regime.
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The data include the top three levels of the bureaucratic hierarchy: organizational heads (fi-
nance ministers and central bank governors), their immediate subordinates, and third-tier officials
such as department directors and central bank Board members. These three levels of the hierarchy
encompass the most visible officials in these countries: for example, these elites’ names are listed
on official documents, and their appointments receive media attention. Within finance ministries,
the data include third-tier officials only in departments with general macroeconomic policy respon-
sibilities, excluding those with tax, trade or other more specific duties. This decision reflects the
difficulty of collecting career history data in these countries, which required limiting the scope of
data collection. While the data therefore encompass only a specific policy area, this dataset com-
plements previous biographical sources on senior policymakers in developing countries (Chwieroth,
2007: e.g.), which typically focus on organizational heads. Moreover, the data encompasses the
population (not a sample) of occupants of the top three tiers of macroeconomic policy authority in
these countries. The dataset includes records of each senior position held by these officials during
the time period, as well as other biographical information including educational background and
affiliations with external organizations. The full dataset includes 150 officials in Mexico (126 for
the period since 1982) and 246 in Argentina.
In order to infer networks from career paths, I make three plausible assumptions about the
implications of organizational co-affiliations to code ties based on recruitment, experience, and
joint external* affiliations. First, senior bureaucrats select trusted individuals as their subordinates.
The coding scheme thus defines a recruitment tie* as a link between the head of each organization
(minister or governor) and his appointees, creating a star-shaped network around the head. A
subordinate is an appointee if they change positions between year t and t–1. Second, officials who
have extensive joint work experience are more likely to develop a relationship of trust. To capture
this, I define an experience tie as a link between pairs of bureaucrats (both within and between
organizations) in each presidential administration who had worked together during a previous
administration.24 In other words, for each pair of individuals who hold any job in period p, an
experience relationship is coded as present if they previously worked in the same organization
in any period before p25. For example, if two central bank Board members (third-tier officials)
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are both appointed to positions in the finance ministry in a subsequent administration, a tie is
coded as present at the second time point. Similarly, if only one official moves to the central
bank, the prior experience creates a tie between officials across organizations. Third, previous
studies have pointed to the role of external organizations such as universities and think tanks in
shaping elite recruitment. Thus,* affiliation* ties are between pairs of bureaucrats (both within
and across organizations) who have both worked in the same outside university or think tank in
a research or teaching capacity. The organizations included in the analysis (summarized in table
2) have been recognized in previous literature on these countries as important for the formation
of policy elites (Babb, 2001; Heredia, 2004; Biglaiser, 2002). For both experience and affiliation
ties, between-organization ties (i.e. across finance ministries and central banks) are particularly
important, insofar as these informal bridges facilitate inter-organizational cooperation. All ties are
binary and undirected. In order to test the robustness of these results to the coding scheme, I
report results below dropping experience and external ties from the analysis.
[Table 2 about here]
Ties based on these coding rules cumulate over time, such that relationships formed in early
periods remain in later periods. This approach assumes that relationships are durable and remain
socially meaningful over decades. In the main analysis, I select a subset of elites who held positions
during a ten-year window around the peak of the financial crises (1989–1999 in Mexico and 1996–
2006 in Argentina. In further analyses, I select subsets of elites active during each presidential
administration in order to explore temporal variation.
While a variety of common network measures report higher levels of elite cohesion in Mexico
than in Argentina, the most rigorous approach to measuring cohesion is the cohesive blocking
method (Moody and White, 2003). This technique conceptualizes cohesion in terms of multiple
independent paths. The algorithm iteratively identifies sets (or blocks) of nodes in a network that
are connected by a specified number of paths by “removing” a set of nodes that disconnects the
graph. The cohesiveness of each block is defined as the value k, equal to “the minimum number
of independent paths linking each pair of actors in the group” (Moody and White, 2003: 109).
The algorithm allows for both nesting and overlapping blocks, yielding a rich description of the
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cohesive structure of a network. Visualization is a key tool for interpreting networks, allowing
complex structures to be understood intuitively and conveying information difficult to summarize
via summary indexes (Moody et al., 2005). In this sense, the observation that the Mexican elite
is more cohesive than its Argentine counterpart is best demonstrated by examining the cohesive
blocking structure. I also summarize the results of the cohesive blocking analysis by reporting the
cut-level cohesion (the level of k of the most cohesive block of which two nodes are members) between
senior officials (organization heads) and the mean cut level across all officials. The former has two
variants: inter-organizational cohesion, or the dyadic cohesion between the finance minister and
governor of the central bank, and inter-cohort cohesion, or the cohesion between each incumbent
official and their successor. This is an important metric on which to judge elite cohesion: the
Argentine policy conflicts discussed above often occurred between the competing heads of these
policy organizations or between incumbents and their successors.
The full dataset contains nearly twice as many individuals for Argentina as it does for Mexico
due to faster turnover in the Argentine elite.26 The subset of nodes active during the crisis period
contains 64 nodes for Mexico and 108 for Argentina. The different N introduces the possibility
that differences in elite cohesion are an artifact of population size or turnover. This is one reason
to interpret cautiously standard cohesion measures such as density, which is influenced by network
size. However, cohesive blocking is less sensitive to differences in network size with these data. The
cohesion level k of a group is bounded by the size of this group, because the maximum possible
k in a network of N nodes is N–1, when N form a clique. However, this is only a concern as
the density of networks approaches 1, because only if the full network forms a clique does this
constraint become relevant. These networks are far less dense (see table 3 below). Experience ties
reflect turnover by construction, but in practice exclude ties formed simply because elites remain in
the same positions, because extremely few appointments last longer than a single administration.
Below, I show that the results are robust to excluding both experience ties (which are sensitive to
turnover) and affiliation ties (which are not).
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3.2 The structure of bureaucratic elites
I begin by visualizing the full cumulative networks for both countries, spanning the period from the
early 1980s to 2010, in figures 1 and 2. These figures suggest striking variation in the cohesiveness
of the Mexican and Argentine technocratic elites. Figure 1 depicts a densely interconnected cluster
of nodes at the core of the Mexican elite, which includes most of the senior organizational heads
active over this period of nearly 30 years. The densest area at the center of the diagram includes
many officials active during the crisis period (see node descriptions in the diagram). In contrast,
the Argentine elite network consists largely of distinct “stars” representing the allies of particular
organization heads, with minimal interconnection. Some more cohesive structures are present,
such as the cliques associated with nodes 14 and 13, but these clusters are locally cohesive but
structurally isolated. These initial visualizations suggest that the Argentine elite network has been
composed of competing factions, while the Mexican network has formed a single cohesive group.
[Figures 1 and 2 about here]
A number of standard indicators of network cohesion reported in table 3 confirm this visual
impression. This table reports network measures calculated for elites active during the crisis period,
as defined above. The density of the Mexican elite is more than twice that of Argentina (though
density may be confounded with network size). Mexican elites are also better connected: the crisis-
period elite forms a single component, whereas less than half of Argentine elites are connected.
Because the Argentine diagram is disconnected, standard shortest path measures are not appro-
priate. To correct for this, I calculate compactness (Borgatti et al., 2013: 154), or the average
of reciprocal shortest path lengths (substituting zero in disconnected paths). By this metric, the
Mexican network is five times as cohesive.
The final line in table 3 reports mean cut-level cohesion based on the cohesive blocking method-
ology. By this metric, the Mexican network is nearly three times as cohesive as its Argentine
counterpart. However, the best way to interpret the cohesive blocking method is via the block
structure of these networks. This structure is represented in figures 3 and 4 using a Euler diagram
(a Venn diagram generalized to nesting and multiple overlaps).27 Darker shades of gray correspond
to higher values of k in that block. For illustrative purposes, the names of organizational heads are
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noted on the diagram, along with the number of additional nodes included in each block.
[Figures 3 and 4 about here]
The structure of cohesive blocks reveals the fragmentation of the Argentine policy elite into
several competing factions, as well as minor groups and isolated individuals. Figure 4 shows four
relatively small cohesive groups, corresponding to the heterodox (centered on finance minister
Machinea), CEMA (centered on finance minister Fernández and central bank governor Pou), and
Cavallo factions discussed above (the fourth cohesive faction corresponds to the FIEL think tank,
which briefly controlled the finance ministry during 2001). While these factions are internally
cohesive, ties between factions are diffuse: the pre–2001 elite network can be split apart by removing
only two nodes, while the post–2001 is entirely disconnected. In contrast, figure 3 shows that the
cohesive blocking structure of the Mexican policy elite consists of a single densely interconnected
group. At the center of this network is a deeply nested core of officials which includes the senior
officials active during the crisis: finance ministers Aspe (1988–1994) and Ortiz (1994–1997) and
central bank governor Miguel Mancera (1982–1998). Jaime Serra (who served briefly as finance
minister during the crisis before being dismissed) is also tied to this group at the level k=5. The
least cohesive connected organization head in the Mexican elite is finance minister Gurria (1997–
2000), who assumed this position relatively late in the crisis. Even so, this actor is connected to
the core of the elite at the level k=4, twice as high as the cohesion level connecting the Argentine
elite.
A complementary perspective on the cohesive structure of these elites is provided by figure
5, which depicts inter-organizational (solid lines) and inter-cohort cohesion (points) at the senior
level during the ten-year period surrounding the crises in both countries. Figure 5 shows that
throughout the crisis period, inter-organizational and inter-cohort cohesion remained substantially
higher in Mexico than in Argentina. While inter-organizational cohesion fell in 1998 (reflecting
the appointment of the less-densely linked Gurria), cohesion remained twice that in Argentina.
Inter-organizational cohesion was relatively high in Argentina until 1999, when both the central
bank and finance ministry were both controlled by the CEMA faction, but fell to low levels in
2000 and did not recover. In other words, whereas the Mexican finance ministry and central bank
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were controlled by elites embedded in a single cohesive group throughout the crisis, in Argentine
this ceased to be the case early in the crisis. Moreover, the replacement of the CEMA-affiliated
finance minister by his “heterodox” opponent in 2000 reflects the transfer of control of the ministry
between competing factions.
One concern about these results is that the varying level of cohesion may be an artifact of the
assumptions of particular coding rules. One possibility is that the results are driven by organi-
zational turnover rates (which, as noted above, are higher in Argentina), which are reflected in
experience ties. Greater cohesion due to lower turnover is not necessarily an artifact, but it is still
instructive to consider how turnover affects these results. Table 4 shows that differences between
the Mexican and Argentine elite structures hold when excluding either experience or external af-
filiation ties from the coding scheme. Indeed, even when including only recruitment ties (which
discards much of the information available from career histories), the Mexican elite remains twice
as cohesive by the mean cut-level metric.
The central implication of these findings is that the Argentine policy elite was composed of
competing factions during the 2001 crisis, while the Mexican elite was composed of a single cohesive
group. In the next section, I extend the analysis by showing how temporal variation in elite cohesion,
particularly in Mexico, helps establish the weak link between elite network structure and political
institutions.
4 Political institutions and elite conflict
The analysis thus far has shown that elite conflict was much greater in Argentina than Mexico,
documented the mechanisms of consensus formation, and shown that the Mexican technocratic
elite is more cohesive than its Argentine counterpart. An obvious concern is that elite networks
may be endogenous to underlying political institutions, such as party systems and political regimes,
which account for both elite network structure and policy consensus. In this case, elite networks
may simply be a conduit transmitting the influence of political institutions to technocratic elites.
Indeed, the correlation between elite structure and consensus might be spurious if elite networks
simply reflect political institutions but have no true impact on consensus.
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Certainly, political institutions can shape the structure of elite networks. To a significant extent,
the political institutions that dominated Mexico for most of the twentieth century facilitated the
formation of a cohesive elite. However, the PRI system was not always capable of sustaining either
cohesion or consensus; these varied over time while the political regime remained roughly constant.
Thus, there are two empirical inconsistencies facing an account of Mexican elite consensus that
rests on political institutions alone. First, both cohesion and consensus vary over time in Mexico:
during the early 1980s, the Mexican elite was more fragmented and conflict more intense. Second,
elite cohesion outlasted the demise of the one-party regime; a decade after the democratic transition
of 2000, network structures remained cohesive.
The cohesive network structure that existed in the mid–1990s was not a permanent feature of the
Mexican political elite; rather, it was an structure that emerged following a period of fragmentation
during the 1970s and 80s. Figure 6 reports mean cut level cohesion and compactness for time varying
networks, incorporating the earlier data for Mexico. This figure selects nodes active during each
presidential administration, making use of the full dataset. During the early 1980s, Mexican elite
cohesion was at low levels comparable to those observed in Argentina; the cohesive Mexican elite
did not form until the mid–1980s. Thus, these results show that the existence of a one-party regime
in Mexico was not a sufficient condition for elite cohesion.
[Figure 6 about here]
Lower levels of cohesion in Mexico were matched by greater elite conflict during this period.
In contrast to elite consensus in 1994, during an earlier financial crisis in 1982, policy-making
dynamics resembled those in Argentina: competing factions attempted to impose their differing
policy proposals in the face of internal opposition. The clearest illustration of this dynamic was
the deep conflict over nationalization of the banking system. In this debate, a “heterodox” faction
of elites championed nationalization and other policies over the objections of more “orthodox”
central bank and finance ministry officials (Babb, 2001; Centeno, 1997). In a close parallel to
the competitive Argentine policy-making process, the head of the central bank resigned his post
in protest after losing the battle. The nationalization dispute was the most dramatic of several
internal policy conflicts, including budget balance, wage adjustment policies, and foreign exchange
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controls. This conflictual and entrepreneurial policy-making process resembled the competitive
dynamics of Argentine policymaking.
A second empirical limitation for an institutional theory of elite cohesion is that the structure of
the Mexican elite outlasted the demise of these institutions with the defeat of the PRI in the 2000
presidential elections. The persistence of cohesion is also reflected in figure 6 which shows that mean
dyadic cohesion remained high in Mexico in the period following 2000. This persistence reflects
the remarkable fact that, despite gaining control of the executive branch following seventy years
of one-party rule, the incoming National Action Party government appointed technocratic elites
with decades of experience under PRI governments to senior positions. Thus, there was substantial
continuity in the individual elites represented in the bureaucratic elite following the democratic
“transition” of 2000, which facilitated the maintenance of elite cohesion. The persistence of cohesion
after 2000 shows that the correlation between political institutions and network structures is loose,
undermining the view that elite structure is a simple function of political regime or party system. It
is likely that the one-party Mexican regime facilitated the emergence of a cohesive network; however,
this particular political institution was not a sufficient condition for a cohesive technocratic elite.
5 Elite professionalization and ideas
A second alternative explanation for elite consensus is that shared ideas drawn from common
experiences of elite training and professionalization are the primary determinant of technocratic
consensus. Chwieroth (2007) presents a measure of technocratic “coherence” based on the number of
senior central bank and finance ministry officials with Ph.D.s from elite U.S. economics departments.
Similarly, Babb (2001) argues that the emergence of US-trained economists as key policymakers
facilitated the emergence of consensus on market reforms in Mexico.
However, a combination of quantitative and qualitative data suggest that shared educational
backgrounds are not a sufficient condition for elite consensus. Figure 7 reports the proportion of
officials with elite economics Ph.D.s, following the definition of Chwieroth (2007). At first glance,
these time trends might seem to support a professionalization theory of elite conflict: in Argentina,
the proportion of elite economists declined sharply during the crisis years, falling to zero. However,
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elite conflict was high in Argentina both when the proportion of elite economists was at its peak
in 1999 (at about 40% of elite officials), and when the proportion of elite economists had fallen to
zero in 2003. Conflict in 1999 occurred among officials with elite economics backgrounds, while
conflicts later occurred among officials without them. Thus, the level of elite conflict in Argentina
remained high while the educational composition of the technocratic elite fluctuated wildly.
[Figure 7 about here]
Moreover, at the peak of the crises (1994 in Mexico and 2001 in Argentina), the proportion of
elite U.S.-educated economists was similar: roughly 20%. While this figure does represent a sudden
shift in the educational composition of the Argentine elite (the rapid decline in the proportion of elite
Ph.D.s from around 40% in 1999 to less than 10% in 2000, followed by a temporary recovery), the
low proportion of elite economists in Mexico is not sufficient to account for elite consensus. These
data show that elite economists represent a minority of senior bureaucrats in both countries; while
the proportion of American Ph.D.s increased in both countries during the 1990s, the dominance
of this educational trajectory has been somewhat overstated. At its peak, the proportion of such
officials in Argentina was less than 40%, in Mexico, roughly a third of officials have held an elite
Ph.D. in recent years. Thus, in both countries, officials with elite economics Ph.D.s represented a
minority (albeit sizable) of officials, and at the time of the crisis this minority was of similar size.
Qualitative data behind these aggregate trends reveals the limitations of shared educational
background as an indicator of consensus. Conflicts in Argentina often occurred between elites with
similar professional backgrounds. Both the CEMA group and Domingo Cavallo held economics
Ph.D.s from elite U.S. economics departments (Chicago and Harvard, respectively), but feuded
bitterly over economic policy. A similar “Chicago versus Cambridge” split failed to emerge in Mex-
ico, despite the co-existence of officials with degrees from these institutions. Even many members
of the “heterodox” faction in fact held economics degrees from the U.S. Conversely, because the
proportion of elite Ph.Ds in the Argentine elite had dropped to zero by 2003, conflicts between the
central bank and finance ministry were not disputes between liberal U.S. technocrats and those
with different educational backgrounds: there were no elite U.S. economists left to fight with.
Ideas clearly matter; elites form policy preferences drawing on their educational backgrounds.
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However, comparison of these cases shows that professional training — and in particular elite
economics Ph.D.s — are less predictive of policy positions than has been previously suggested. In-
dicators based on economics training such as that used by Chwieroth (2007) undoubtedly capture
important variations in these elites, but describing this property as “coherence” may not be accu-
rate. Stated differently, appointing elite economists to senior positions is not a sufficient condition
for elite consensus.
6 Sectoral interests
A final alternative explanation assumes that technocrats are “agents” of organized business and
infers their preferences from the economic interests of particular economic sectors. While a full
discussion of the role of business politics in these countries goes beyond the scope of this paper,
this section shows that there are major limitations to a theory which reduces technocratic conflict
to business interests.
Some scholars (e.g. Castellani and Schorr, 2004) argue that the main axis of conflict in Argentina
during the 1999–2001 period was between pro-dollarization financial interests and industrialist sup-
porters of devaluation. However, there is little evidence that these sectors actively lobbied for these
policies. Rather, the main business associations, including both the manufacturer’s association
and banking association, publicly supported continuity with the convertibility system. Indeed, the
organized financial sector publicly opposed dollarization.28 Similarly, there is little evidence of
lobbying for devaluation on the part of the industrial sector.29 Rather, firms lobbied for measures
to compensate for the overvalued exchange rate, such as favorable tax treatment. Indeed, because
many firms were highly indebted in dollars, many firms would (and in fact did) suffer from devalu-
ation, complicating the formation of any pro-devaluation industrial coalition (c.f. Woodruff, 2005).
Rather than a sectoral conflict, the dollarization debate was largely a dispute between different
factions of the Argentine technocratic elite.
Even when Argentine technocratic elites expressed commitments to specific business interests,
their policy positions were often loosely connected to those interests. For example, one Argentine
central bank governor, Aldo Pignanelli (a former public sector banker), was an adherent to the
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“productive movement,” an industrialist lobby dedicated to advocating for the interests of the
manufacturing sector. Yet in his conflict with the finance ministry, Pignanelli took positions similar
to those of his predecessor, an economist and former IMF official, and his successor, a former J.P.
Morgan trader. Thus, even the explicit sectoral alignments of technocratic officials are loosely
linked at best to their actions as government officials. Scholars of Latin American business politics
(Schneider, 2004) have shown that Argentine business is politically fragmented; in this sense, it is
not surprising that state elites did not express unified sectoral preferences.
Of course, the fact that sectoral interests do not explain conflict among technocratic policy-
makers does not mean that these interests have no impact on policy outcomes; business interests
have many means to influence economic policy without acquiring agents within the state. However,
the preferences of technocratic actors cannot be reduced to the particular interests of organized
business.
7 Conclusion
To summarize, historical analysis and systematic network data provide strong evidence that the
structural cohesion of elite networks facilitates policy consensus. In Mexico, a cohesive policy
network formed in the 1980s, facilitating consensus formation within this elite despite substantial
errors and external criticism during the 1994 crisis. Temporal variation in the level of elite cohesion
shows that this network was not a simple reflection of the one-party Mexican state; cohesion was
lower and conflict greater during the earlier 1982 crisis and, conversely, elite cohesion outlasted
the 2000 democratic transition. In contrast, elite cohesion in Argentina remained perennially low;
competition among factions and individuals contributed to elite conflict throughout the 2001 crisis.
This paper began by noting that previous scholars have argued that elite consensus and cohesion
shape the ability of technocrats to implement and consolidate policy reforms. The Mexican and
Argentine cases suggest that cohesion is more important for consolidation than for implementation.
Both countries implemented market reforms during the 1990s, but these reforms were consolidated
in Mexico but reversed in Argentina following the crisis. Argentine economic policy has been
considerably more volatile than in Mexico: policies have swung from the “heterodox” stabilization
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strategies of the 1980s to the neoliberal reforms of the 1990s to the reversal of these reforms in recent
years. Without suggesting that technocratic cohesion explains everything about economic policy-
making in these countries, the failure to consolidate neoliberal reforms in Argentina is probably
related to the fragmentation of the technocratic elite. During the 1990s, the technocratic elite
appeared unified around liberal reforms; the crisis exposed a deep rift between the two main factions
responsible for these policies. The competition and infighting between these groups ultimately
undermined them both, opening the door for the entrance of elites with opposing policy agendas. In
contrast, Mexican economic policy has been stable, despite the historic transformations associated
with the 2000 elections.
More generally, this paper has theoretical implications for competing perspectives on economic
policy-making, often summarized by their varying emphasis on interests, institutions and ideas
(Hall, 1997). Scholars also discuss policy networks, but networks do not fit standard definitions of
these concepts. In keeping with a broader theoretical shift towards relational sociology (Emirbayer,
1997), this paper shows that relations and networks cannot be neglected. Obviously, networks
do not supplant ideas, interests and institutions, but this analysis shows that ignoring relational
structures may lead to incorrect inferences. For example, temporal variation in the cohesion of
the Mexican policy elite shows that a relational phenomenon which might at first appear a simple
reflection of an institution — the one-party Mexican regime — is in fact relatively independent of
that institution. Similarly, some scholars have attributed elite consensus around the “Washington
consensus” to the ideas of technocratic policymakers, as shaped by their education (Babb, 2001;
Chwieroth, 2007). However, this paper shows that ideas in this sense are not a sufficient condition
for consensus; despite similar backgrounds, competing factions in Argentine fought bitterly. This
does not imply that ideas or professionalization do not matter, but rather that these factors are
refracted through the relational dynamics of elites. Finally, while I have shown that elite policy
conflicts (such as those in Argentina) cannot always be reduced to interests outside the state,
further research should consider how the interests of technocratic elites depend on the structure of
elite networks.
To conclude, sociologists and political scientists have long discussed the importance of elite
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policy-making networks in the developing world, but have seldom studied the structure of these
networks, particularly using systematic data. Both theoretically and empirically, a gulf has re-
mained between political sociology and social network analysis literatures. This paper has taken a
step towards closing this gulf by specifying cohesion as property of elite networks and demonstrating
its effects.
Notes
1I focus on business interests because organized labor was relatively marginalized in both countries during this
period.
2Collected at the Instituto Gino Germani in Buenos Aires, available at http://iigg.sociales.uba.ar/archivo-de-
historia-oral/.
3“Report of Michael W. Mackey on the Comprehensive Evaluations of the Operations and Functions of the
Protection of Bank Savings ‘FOBAPROA’ and Quality of Supervision of the FOBAPROA Program 1995–1998”, July
1999.
4In this paper, “finance minister” refers to the Argentine Minister of the Economy and the Mexican Treasury
Secretary; “central bank governor” refers to the head of the central bank (whose actual title in Argentina is president).
5Clarín, “Machinea: Roque sufre de inacción y está paralizado,” 3/22/98; Clarín, “Machinea insiste: la fiesta se
acabó”
6Ámbito Financiero, “C. Rodriguez: ‘El impuestazo era totalmente innecesario,”’ 3/8/2000
7Anonymous interviews and Argentine central bank documents.
8Clarín, “Dolarización es un error garrafal,” 1/24/99
9Buenos Aires Herald, “Cavallo is not a capitalist,” 7/8/2001 (interview with Carlos Rodríguez)
10Clarín, “La nueva etapa: El titular del BCRA defendió su gestión,” 4/14/2001
11La nación, “Maccarone presidirá el banco central,” 4/24/01
12La nación, “Una batalla sin fin entre dos duros peronistas bonaerenses,” 12/6/02
13Anonymous interview, IMF official.
14La Nación, “Polémica difusión de la carta de intención,” 10/17/02
15The Wall Street Journal, “Peso Surprise,” 7/6/95.
16Interviews with former central bank officials.
17The Wall Street Journal, “Peso Surprise,” 7/6/95.
18Pedro Aspe, letter to the editor of the Wall Street Journal, July 1995. While Aspe’s claim that he achieved
consensus may be considered self-serving, no interviewees disagreed.
19Anonymous interviews with Bank of Mexico officials and Jonathan Heath, Reforma, “£Cuál debería ser el regimen
cambiario?” 9/28/95
20Interview, former governor of the Mexican central bank.
21Anonymous interviews with senior Mexican officials.
22Anonymous Interview
23Anonymous interview
24I exclude, however, the immediately preceding presidential administration in central banks, because appointment
periods in these organizations frequently overlap administrations. This is a conservative assumption because it
particularly limits the number of ties coded as present in Mexico, thus avoiding overstating the different levels of
cohesion in the two countries.
25Previous work experience is defined as joint appointments in the same division or in the same tier. Practically
speaking, this encompasses all officials within each organization (central bank or finance ministry) with the exception
of third-tier finance ministry officials, for whom experience across tiers and divisions are excluded (for example,
a third tier official does not establish a tie with a second tier offiical in a different division. This restriction is
appropriate to the substantive meaning of accumulated experience, but practically speaking has few consequences for
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the resulting networks. This restriction does not apply to central banks because second-tier officials are not organized
into divisions.
26The number of available positions in Mexico is slightly higher (mean 11, sd 2.2) than Argentina (mean 8, sd 1.6);
thus, the larger N in Argentina necearily reflects turnover rather than organizational size.
27Euler diagrams with many sets are computationally challenging; this diagram was produced manually. Blocks
were selected by choosing the largest block within each horizontally differentiated “branch” of the block structure at
each level of cohesion (k). The size and proportions of each ellipse have been chosen to facilitate readability.
28The head of the Argentine Banking Association stated that former President Menem was playing “political
games” in advocating dollarization (Clarin, 8/15/2000) and stated that “institutionally, we don’t agree” (La Nación,
8/13/01) with the proposal. Similarly Bank Boston CEO (head of the Argentine Business Council), stated “we don’t
propose either dollarization or devaluation” (Clarin, 12/15/01).
29As late as November 2001 (barely a month before the devaluation) the head of the Argentine Industrial Union
stated that “Argentina cannot devalue today in the situation it’s in” (comments at 2001 meeting of the Argentine
Industrial Union, available at http://www.uia.org.ar/cye.do?id=1&cid=66, p. 51).
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Figure 1: Mexican techocratic network, 1983-2010
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Figure 2: Argentine technocratic network, 1984-2010
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Figure 3: Mexican elite core (selected cohesive blocks)
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Figure 4: Argentine elite core (selected cohesive blocks)
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Figure 5: Inter-organizational and Inter-cohort cohesion
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Figure 6: Evolution of elite cohesion
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Figure 7: Policymakers with elite economics Ph.D.
0.0
0.2
0.4
19
85
19
90
19
95
20
00
20
05
20
10
%
 o
f o
ffi
cia
ls
Country
Argentina
Mexico
Note: Vertical lines mark crisis years.
38
Table 1: Resignations and Removals of Senior Officials
Name Position End of Term
Argentina
Roque Ferna´ndez Economy Minister, 1996-99 normal
Domingo Cavallo Economy Minister, 2001 Resigned
Pedro Pou Central Bank President, 1996-2001 removed
Jose´ Luis Machinea Economy Minister, 1999-2001 resigned
Ricardo Lo´pez Murphy Economy Minister, 2001 resigned
Roque Maccarone Central Bank President, 2001 resigned
Jorge Remes Lenicov Economy Minister, 2002 resigned
Mario Blejer Central Bank President, 2002 resigned
Roberto Lavagna Economy Minister, 2002-2005 removed
Aldo Pignanelli Central Bank President, 2002 resigned
Alfonso Prat Gay Central Bank President, 2003 removed
Mexico
Miguel Mancera Central Bank Governor, 1982-1998 normal
Pedro Aspe Treasury Secretary, 1988-1994 normal
Jaime Serra Treasury Secretary, December 1994 removed
Guillermo Ortiz Treasury Secretary, 1994-1998 normal
Jose Angel Gurria Treasury Secretary, 1998-2000 normal
Francisco Gil Dı´az Treasury Secretary, 2000-2006 normal
Note: Normal: appointment ended as scheduled
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Table 2: External policy organizations
Argentina Mexico
Center for Macroeconomic Studies
(CEMA)
Autonomous Technological Insti-
tute of Mexico (ITAM)
Mediterranean Foundation College of Mexico
Institute for the Study of State and
Society (IDES)
Monterrey Institute of Technology
and Higher Education (ITESM)
Foundation for Latin American Eco-
nomic Research (FIEL)
Catholic University of Argentina
Table 3: Elite network cohesion
Variable Argentina Mexico
Density 0.03 0.07
Connectivity 0.41 1.00
Mean inverted path length 0.04 0.20
Mean cut level 0.46 1.40
Table 4: Sensitivity: mean dyadic cohesion under alternate coding
Argentina Mexico
Recruitment 0.41 0.97
Recruitment + experience 0.60 1.18
Recruitment + external affiliation 0.45 1.28
All ties 0.46 1.40
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